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Vladimiro Sassone Motivation 
  (Meta)data is almost entirely neglected in the process calculi literature 
  Track data provenance both for its important applications and as an 
challenging exercise in modelling (meta)data. We aim at simplicity: 
  data annotations representing provenance 
  structure, interpretation and management of provenance information 
  provenance tracking 
  Provenance-based security (aspects: trust + data confidentiality and privacy) 
  Example: photography competition 
  The overall ambition is to underpin practical development, like trust-policy 
languages and protocols, and provenance-middleware Model features 
  Two the central features of the basic model: 
1.  values are annotated with their provenance 
2.  provenance is kept up-to-date as computation proceeds 
  Focus on one particular kind of provenance information: 
  The principals that influenced a value, and how they did it Provenance model 
Annotated data 
Actual data  Meta information 
describing the origin 
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of channel used 
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of channel used Confidentiality in provenance systems 
  Data may be public, yet its provenance confidential, or vice versa 
  Principals who may access data are not necessarily the same as 
those who may access its provenance 
  In general, fine grained access control over provenance “histories” 
is needed as different parts of it have different sensitivity 
Security requirements of  
data 
Security requirements of its 
provenance  ≠ Hiding provenance trees 
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j  c  a   To achieve this, we use groups 
  Different principals belong to different groups 
  Group membership determines what parts of a provenance list a principal has 
access to 
  Principals  
  Can create new groups: 
  Can add other principals to their groups:  
  Can restrict access to particular parts of a provenance tree to a particular 
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photography competition Current work 
  Correctness of provenance tracking: the provenance information determines the 
history of each piece of data accurately “enough” 
  Express this as a form of testing (on traces): 
  Using provenance: 
  Provenance queries vs pattern restricted input 
  Trust in quality of data based on trust in principals and provenance of data 
  Policies and types   
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